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1. Introduction
This note presents an overview of the use of emergency powers in Canada. I begin 
with a discussion of the threat that the extravagant use of emergency powers poses 
to constitutional government and then switch to a historical summary of the use of 
emergency powers in Canada. Finally, I consider Canada’s new Anti-terrorism Act 
which effectively grants permanent “emergency” powers to both the executive 
branch of the legislature and law enforcement agencies.
All states in the world have constitutions, either written or unwritten. 
However, only a minority of these states have a system of government which can be 
described as “constitutional”.1 The challenge of constitutional government lies in 
ensuring that the state apparatus actually operates in accordance with the constitu­
tion. Many factors and pressures may lead to a constitution becoming “nominal” or 
“semantic”.2 Emergency powers are, in my view, the most destructive of these fac­
tors and pressures. The lavish and profligate use of emergency powers permitted by 
anti-terrorism legislation may become an irresistible threat to constitutional govern­
ment. Yet, the invocation of emergency powers is an issue that arises inevitably in all 
constitutional democracies:3
In the life of every nation there will arise occasions when peace and tranquility 
may be disrupted by natural or economic disasters or threatened by internal dis­
sension or external aggression.
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1 This question is discussed in the magnificent essay by Karl Loewenstein, “Reflections on the Value 
of Constitutions in our Revolutionary Age” in David E. Apter and Harry Eckstein, eds., Comparative 
Politics, New York, The Free Press, 1963, p. 149.
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Many constitutions make express provision for both the invocation and the exercise 
of emergency powers.4 Canada’s does not. However, an emergency powers doctrine, 
whether set out expressly or not, probably inheres in all constitutions. In his judg­
ment in Fort Frances Pulp and Paper Co. v. Manitoba Free Press5 Lord Haldane rea­
soned that the necessary power to permit the state to deal with an emergency could 
be implied from the very existence of a constitution.
The very notion of emergency powers is contradictory. The defining principle 
of constitutional government is the Rule of Law. This principle requires that the state 
always act in accordance with the law.6 Section 52(1) of Canada’s Constitution Act, 
1982 clearly establishes this principle by declaring that “the Constitution...is the 
supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Constitution is... of no force or effect.” The notion of emergency powers contradicts 
the Rule of Law because it posits that, in times of national crisis, the state may act 
outside constitutional norms. The idea is that whenever the existence of the state is 
imperilled, it may take extraordinary steps in order to save itself. Lord Haldane spoke 
of “... some extraordinary peril to the national life ... such as the cases arising out 
of a war.”7
While there is no universally accepted definition of emergency, it is generally 
understood that an emergency is, and must be, temporary. This is because an emer­
gency involves conditions which are aberrant, atypical, and extreme emergency 
powers intended to deal with unusual situations must, by definition, be unusual and 
temporary.
4 Although the U.S. Constitution does not expressly deal with emergencies, the Supreme Court man­
aged to elaborate something close to an emergency powers doctrine in Korematsu v. United States, 323 
U.S. 214 (1944). For a full discussion of the U.S. jurisprudence, see Charles I. Lugosi, AThe Rule of 
Law or Rule by Law: The Detention of Yaser Hamdi@, (2003) 30 American Journal o f Criminal Law 
225.
5 [1923] A.C. 695, [1923] 3 D.L.R. 629 (J.C.P.C.).
6 Roncarelli v. Duplessis (1959), 16 D.L.R. (2d) 689 (S.C.C.). See also, R.F.V. Heuston, Essays in 
Constitutional Law, 2nd ed. (London: Stevens and Sons, 1964) at 32-57.
7 Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider [1925] A.C. 396 at 412, [1925] 2 D.L.R. 5.
Article Four of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 states:
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the exis­
tence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present 
Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the pres­
ent Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation ...
Ian Brownlie, ed., Basic Documents on Human Rights (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971) at 213.
The danger of using emergency powers as more than a temporary measure 
became evident in Asia and Africa where colonial governments used emergency 
powers lavishly.8 In some parts of the world emergency powers have become a sub­
stitute for the normal system of government9 and states of emergency have become 
permanent.10
During states of emergency, governments limit basic rights and freedoms.11 
The usual constitutional rules which constrain the exercise of state power are set 
aside.12 The two most common infringements of rights and freedoms which govern­
ments impose during emergencies are censorship and a regime of arbitrary arrest and 
detention without trial. States equipped with such sweeping powers may well 
become dictatorial and oppressive.
2. The War Measures Act, Two World Wars and After
a. The War Measures Act
For many years the Canadian law of emergency powers was found in the War 
Measures Act, an ordinary federal statute. Originally enacted in 191413 to give the 
national government the powers it believed it needed to prosecute the war effective­
ly, the War Measures Act remained law until 1988, though not normally in operation. 
The Act was unusual. It could only be invoked by a proclamation of the Govemor- 
in-Council.14 It dealt, per section 2, with “war, invasion or insurrection, real or appre­
hended”, but the section precluded judicial review of the Govemor-in-Council’s 
decision to issue a proclamation. Section 2 actually stated that such a proclamation 
was to be “conclusive evidence” of the existence of war, invasion or insurrection. So, 
the answer to the question, “How do we really know that war, invasion or insurrec­
tion exists?” was, “Because the Govemor-in-Council says so”. One result of the 
invocation of the Act was to transfer plenary law-making authority from Parliament 
to the executive. Section 3 of the Act empowered the Govemor-in-Council to make 
regulations having the force of law; a power that was, in a practical sense, unlimit­
ed. The section gave the Governor in Council authority to make “. .. such orders and
8 Denys C. Holland, “Emergency Legislation in the Commonwealth” (1960) Current Legal Problems 
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10 See Shamwana v. Attorney General, Supreme Court of Zambia, Judgment No. 35 of 1980.
11 Visuvalingam v. Liyanage [1985] L.R.C. (Const.) 909 (Supreme Court of Sri Lanka).
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13 S.C. 1914 (2d Sess.), c. 2.
14 War Measures Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. W-2, s. 2.
regulations as he may deem necessary . . .” and such regulations could contradict and 
even overrule the express provisions of Acts of Parliament.15
A number of important legal and political questions arise with respect to emer­
gency powers. These questions involve controlling the invocation, the duration and 
the use of emergency powers. The two institutions best positioned to control the use 
of emergency powers are the legislature and the judiciary. Notably, the War Measures 
Act was drafted in such a way as to exclude both legislative and judicial control. As 
we have seen, s. 2 effectively precluded judicial review of its proclamation. Section 
6 created a possibility for limited legislative control. Under certain circumstances 
Parliament could debate the issuance of a proclamation within ten days and if it chose 
to do so, Parliament could adopt a resolution revoking the proclamation.16 Once this 
opportunity had passed, Parliament had no further role to play. The Act would stay 
in operation until such time as the Govemor-in-Council decided to revoke the procla­
mation. The Act, having been proclaimed in 1914, remained in effect until 1920, long 
after hostilities in the Great War had ceased.17
As we have seen, the language used in s. 2 of the War Measures Act made judi­
cial review of any proclamation of that Act unlikely. The rule-making power given 
to the Govemor-in-Council in section 3, therefore, was both sweepingly broad and, 
in a practical sense, unreviewable. Likewise, the decision to revoke the proclamation 
and end the emergency was that of the Govemor-in-Council alone. A failure on the 
part of the Governor to end the emergency would also have been difficult to review. 
As Lord Haldane stated:
The question of the extent to which provision for circumstances such as these
may have to be maintained is one on which a Court of law is loath to enter.18
b. The Great War
The War Measures Act received Royal Assent on August 22, 1914 and the govern­
ment issued a proclamation to the effect that a state of war had existed since August
2. The government quickly promulgated regulations which allowed persons to be 
arrested arbitrarily and interned.19 New regulations also allowed for sweeping cen­
15 Re Gray (1918), 57 S.C.R. 150. In recognizing such an extraordinary power, the Supreme Court of 
Canada stated, “...w e are living in extraordinary times which necessitate the taking of extraordinary 
measures.” (at 182).
16 War Measures Act, supra note 15, s. 6(4).
17 Fort Frances Pulp and Paper Co. v. Manitoba Tree Press Co. [1923] A.C. 695 (J.C.RC.) [Fort 
Frances Pulp and Paper],
•8 Ibid. at 706.
19 D.E. Smith, “Emergency Government in Canada” (1969) 50 Canadian Historical Review  429.
sorship20 and prohibited a wide range of publications,21 including both German-lan- 
guage and Irish Republican publications. In 1918 an Unlawful Associations Order22 
declared a number of organizations to be unlawful. The organisations named includ­
ed Communist, Socialist and Social Democratic groups. In the same year, govern­
ment expanded and brought together the censorship orders in the Consolidated 
Orders Respecting Censorship, 1918.23 These orders were directed largely towards 
publications believed to be of a leftist or Bolshevik nature.
c. Emergencies and Federalism
Federalism is a fundamental element in the Canadian constitutional system. Until 
1982, Canada’s main constitutional instrument was a U.K. statute of 1867 called the 
British North America Act. This statute divided law-making authority between the 
Parliament of Canada and the provincial legislatures. Thus, until 1982, constitution­
al litigation tended to raise division of powers issues. While, as we have seen, regu­
lations adopted pursuant to the War Measures Act during the Great War definitely 
infringed basic liberties, such questions did not arise directly. Legal questions relat­
ed to civil liberties tended to be framed as division of powers issues.24
In normal times, Parliament could only legislate with respect to those matters 
entrusted to it by the British North America Act. The Act similarly circumscribed the 
powers of the provincial legislatures. Section 91 of the British North America Act is 
the section which defines the law-making authority of Parliament. The opening 
words to s. 91 give Parliament the authority to make laws for the “peace, order and 
good government of Canada”. The courts accepted that these words conferred upon 
Parliament the authority to make exceptional laws in the event of a national emer­
gency.25 Subsequent case law established that this exceptional Parliamentary author­
ity included the power to legislate in respect of matters normally within the jurisdic­
tion of the provinces. In the aftermath of the Great War, the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council was prepared to uphold regulations made pursuant to the War 
Measures Act which interfered with “Property and Civil Rights in the province”.26
This issue of federal intrusion into the provincial jurisdiction over property and 
civil rights arose once in peace time. In 1975 the Government of Canada came to
20 Consolidated Orders Respecting Censorship P.C. 1917-146 (January 17).
21 P.C. 1914-94 (November 6).
22 P.C. 1918-2384 (September 23).
23 PC. 1918-1241 (May 22).
24 See Re Alberta Statutes, [1938] S.C.R. 100.
25 Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, [1925] A.C. 396.
26 Fort Frances Pulp and Paper, supra note 18.
believe that an annual inflation rate in excess of 10% constituted a national crisis. 
Consequently, Parliament enacted a statute called the Anti-Inflation Act.27 This Act 
purported to establish a national system of wage and price controls. This system 
interfered with matters normally within the jurisdiction of the provinces and so the 
constitutionality of the Act was open to serious question. The Act was referred to the 
Supreme Court of Canada for a determination of its constitutionality.
In a questionable decision, the Court upheld the validity of the Act.28 However, 
it was immediately apparent that the Act addressed a number of matters which were 
within the jurisdiction of the provinces in normal times. How, then, was its validity 
to be upheld?
The Supreme Court appeared to accept that the Act might be upheld as emer­
gency legislation. However, the Court suggested that, even if it was emergency leg­
islation, it was not essential for Parliament actually to have used the word “emer­
gency” in the statute.29 It would suffice to establish that Parliament had a “rational 
basis” for believing an emergency existed when it enacted the legislation. Actual 
proof of the existence of an emergency would not be necessary.30 It seems that the 
Court upheld the Anti-Inflation Act on the basis that it addressed a “matter of serious 
national concern”.
d. The Second World War
The War Measures Act was reviewed and revised in 1927 and 1938. An 
Interdepartmental Committee on Emergency Legislation stated in its report in 1939,
... this statute confers upon the Executive ample authority to take pretty well 
whatever action might be found to be necessary to meet the exigencies of war or 
other emergency.31
The Act was proclaimed again on September 1, 1939 and backdated to August 25 of 
that year. On September 3, the Defence o f Canada Regulations were promulgated.32 
These regulations were revised and repromulgated later in September.33 Regulation
27 S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 75.
28 Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373.
29 ibid. at 422.
30 Ibid.
31 Report, Ottawa, July 1939.
32 P.C. 1939-2483 (September 3).
33 p.C. 1939-2891 (September 27).
39A, which was adopted during the revision of the regulations, effectively abolished 
free expression in Canada. Regulation 39C  declared various organisations to be ille­
gal. Many of these organisations were communist, which may be odd given that 
Canada and the Soviet Union were both, at least after the summer of 1941, at war 
with Nazi Germany. Regulation 21 made provision for internment of enemy aliens 
and of suspected Nazi sympathisers.
The government of Canada exercised extraordinary powers under the War 
Measures Act for the duration of the war, and made literally thousands of regulations. 
It was pursuant to the Act that the government evacuated Japanese-Canadians from 
the Pacific coast.34
e. Igor Gouzenko
In late 1945, Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk at the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, 
informed the R.C.M.P. that a spy ring was being operated out of the embassy. 
Although hostilities involving Canadians had ended several months earlier, the War 
Measures Act was still in operation. Acting under regulations adopted pursuant to the 
War Measures Act, the R.C.M.P. arrested a number of people. These people were held 
incommunicado, denied legal representation and forced to appear before a Royal 
Commission consisting of two Supreme Court of Canada judges: Mr. Justice Kellock 
and Mr. Justice Taschereau. They were obliged to give evidence against themselves 
without first consulting a lawyer. Some were charged with breaches of the Official 
Secrets Act,35 while others were charged with conspiring to breach the Act.36
f. October 1970
Radical nationalism had been on the rise in Québec throughout the 1960s.37 The 
decade began with the electoral defeat of the Union Nationale government by the lib­
erals under Jean Lesage. Thus began what came to be called la révolution tranquille. 
The aims of this quiet revolution were to end the corruption of Duplessis-style poli-
34 See Joy Kogawa, Obasan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981).
35 R.S.C. 1985, c. 0-5. This statute is still with us, but in 2001 its name was changed to the Security 
o f  Information Act, see Anti-Terrorism Act, S.C. 2001, c. 41, s. 25(1). This change of name in no way 
affected the substance of the Act. For a detailed discussion of the Act, see Robert Martin, Media Law, 
2nd ed., (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003) at 61-65.
36 R. v. Mazerall, [1946] O.R. 762 (C.A.), Rose v. R., [1947] 3 D.L.R. 618 (Que.C.A.).
37 Accounts of the events leading up to the Proclamation of 16 October can be found in R. Haggart and 
A. Golden, Rumours o f War, 2d ed. (Toronto: Calligraph, 1979); G. Pelletier, The October Crisis, trans. 
J. Marshall (Montréal: Mont Royal, 1971); D. Smith, Bleeding Hearts ... Bleeding Country: Canada 
and the Québec Crisis (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1971) and W.S. Tamopolsky, The 
Canadian Bill o f Rights, 2nd ed., (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975) at 321-351. I have relied 
on all four.
tics and to change the neo-colonial38 status of Québécois and make them maîtres chez 
nous. But not everyone in Québec was happy with the Lesage government, especial­
ly as it began to show it was as prone to corruption as its predecessors. Many want­
ed to see Québec break away from Canada and, at the same time, begin a process of 
radical social and economic transformation.
In early 1963 a group calling itself le Front de Libération du Québec (F.L.Q.) 
made its first appearance. We still do not know a great deal about the F.L.Q..39 We 
do not know how many people belonged to it or to what extent it was organized. We 
cannot be certain how much coordination existed between the different units or 
“cells” which used the name F.L.Q.. We cannot even be entirely sure that, as a coor­
dinated organisation, the F.L.Q. ever existed. We do know that the members of the 
F.L.Q. saw it as an anti-colonial liberation movement and that its ideas and objectives 
could loosely be described as Marxist-Leninist.
Nonetheless, there were bombings and thefts, most of them in Montréal. By 
1970 three people, one of them apparently an F.L.Q. bomber, had been killed. The 
number and intensity of these incidents increased throughout 1968 and 1969.
Militant demonstrations and the use of inflammatory language in speeches and 
pamphlets became commonplace in Québec. Pierre Vallières’ book White Niggers o f  
America40 remains the most extreme and inflammatory expression of this period. 
However, it is important to remember that by 1970 militant demonstrations and 
inflammatory language were almost everyday occurrences in most Western coun­
tries.41 What was happening in Québec was not unique. Indeed, Pierre Vallières’ 
book was quickly translated into English and marketed extensively outside Québec.
On October 5, 1970, the “Libération” cell of the F.L.Q. kidnapped James 
Cross, the U.K.’s Trade Commissioner in Montréal. They threatened to kill Cross 
unless certain demands were met. Then on October 10, the “Chenier” cell of the
F.L.Q. kidnapped Pierre Laporte, the Minister of Labour in the Government of 
Québec. Similar threats and demands followed Laporte’s kidnapping.
38 For a definition and elaboration of the meaning of neo-colonialism, see Kwame Nkrumah, Neo­
colonialism, The Last Stage o f Imperialism (London: Nelson, 1965).
39 A version of the events of October 1970, written by a member of the F.L.Q.’s “Chenier” cell, can be 
found in F. Simard, Talking it Out: The October Crisis from Inside, trans. D. Hamel (Montréal: Mont 
Royal, 1987).
40 Trans. J. Pinkham (Toronto: Underground, 1971). Vallières was closely linked to the F.L.Q. and was 
detained in October 1970.
41 This situation, as it manifested itself in Montr?al, was discussed by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
A.G. Canada u Dupond, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 770.
Negotiations ensued. An F.L.Q. manifesto was broadcast over radio and tele­
vision. There were several large demonstrations in Montréal in support of the F.L.Q. 
Negotiations bogged down. The Premier of Québec, the Mayor of Montréal and the 
Montréal Chief of Police all called upon Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau to take 
action. At 4:00 am on the 16th of October the Government of Canada proclaimed the 
War Measures Act. Pierre Laporte was murdered the next day.
The official proclamation42 claimed there was “a state of apprehended insur­
rection within the Province of Québec.” Issued along with the Proclamation were the 
Public Order Regulations, 197043 (the “P.O.R.”). These regulations were made under 
the War Measures Act. They gave the authorities in Québec the extraordinary pow­
ers they had requested. However, the proclamation of the Act and the P.O.R. were not 
limited to Quebec. They also gave extraordinary powers to authorities outside 
Québec.
Montréal and Québec police, assisted by units of the Canadian Armed Forces, 
immediately began making arrests. These three agencies arrested 350 people within 
the first four days. In all, 497 people were arrested. Formal control of the operation 
remained throughout with the government of Québec.
The Preamble to the P.O.R. claimed that one of the P.O.R.’s purposes was to 
“ensure the continued protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
Canada.” How did the P.O.R. achieve this? The simple answer is: by denying just 
about every human right and fundamental freedom anyone might think of.
The P.O.R. deemed the F.L.Q. to be an unlawful association. Membership in 
this unlawful association was made a crime. Advocating the “unlawful acts, aims, 
principles or policies of the unlawful association” was, likewise, made a crime. Thus, 
the P.O.R. recognised guilt by association and punished the expression of opinion.
The P.O.R. defined both police officers and members of the armed forces as 
“peace officers” and granted both groups extraordinary and unprecedented powers. 
In ordinary times in Canada persons may only be arrested without a warrant when 
the arresting police officer has “reasonable and probable grounds” to believe an 
offence has been committed. Under the P.O.R., a peace officer needed only have 
“reason to suspect” that one of the offences specified in the regulations was being 
committed, or was about to be committed, in order to make an arrest without a war­
rant. That is, peace officers had virtually unlimited powers of arrest. Persons arrest­
ed under the P.O.R. could be held in custody without bail and without being brought 
before a court for up to ninety days.
42 S.O.R./1970 -443.
«  S.O.R./197Q -444.
The powers of entry, search and seizure were also greatly expanded. The nor­
mal rule in Canada is that, in order to enter and search premises without the consent 
of the owner or occupier thereof, a police officer requires a warrant signed by a 
Justice of the Peace. Before granting the warrant, the Justice must be satisfied by evi­
dence given on oath that there is a reasonable basis for believing the search will 
reveal material pointing to the commission of a crime.44 Under the P.O.R., suspicion 
alone was enough to permit a peace officer to conduct a search. As with powers of 
arrest, powers of entry and search were virtually unlimited.
Sweeping powers like these almost cry out to be abused. And they were. In the 
first place, the authorities jumped the gun and began rounding people up before the 
War Measures Act was actually proclaimed. Thus, although the proclamation was 
issued on October 16, it was backdated to October 15.45 Secondly, it was reported in 
October 1970 that police and soldiers were instructed to arrest anyone found to be in 
possession of literature or posters that could be described as “extreme left[ist].”46 
Finally, in Vancouver, far removed from extreme manifestations of Québécois 
nationalism, the authorities were able to use the P.O.R. to “get at their favourite tar­
gets.”47
Fortunately for everyone, the state of emergency did not last long. The procla­
mation of the War Measures Act, and the P.O.R., were revoked on 2 December 1970. 
This did not mean the end of the extraordinary powers which had been created. The 
substance of the P.O.R. was restated in the Public Order (Temporary Measures) Act, 
1971.48 The Act lapsed automatically on 30 April 1972. By February 1971, 465 of 
the people arrested had been released. Only two people were ever convicted of 
offences under the P.O.R. or the Public Order Act. All outstanding charges under the 
Act were dropped in August 1971. In spite of this, a court eventually upheld the 
validity of the P.O.R.49
On December 4th the kidnappers of James Cross handed him over to the 
authorities and were given safe passage to Cuba, pursuant to an agreement with the 
authorities. Three members of the “Chenier” cell were arrested on December 27th 
and charged with the kidnapping and murder of Pierre Laporte. Two were subse­
44 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 487.
45 This was expressly stated in the proclamation. See S.O.R./1970-433.
46 See H. Marx, “Human Rights and Emergency Powers” in R.St.J. MacDonald and J.P. Humphrey, 
eds., The Practice of Freedom (Toronto: Butterworths, 1979) at 456.
47 Haggart and Golden, supra note 3738 at 111.
48 S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 2.
49 Gagnon and Vallières v. The Queen (1971), 14 C.R.N.S. 321 (Que. C.A.).
quently convicted of murder. These members of the cell were arrested as the result 
of a normal police investigation.
October 1970 was a shocking experience for Canada and for Québec. Part of 
the shock lay in having to confront history, which, in Denis Smith’s incisive obser­
vation, Canadians believed “. .. happened elsewhere but not at home”.50 But a part 
also lay in having to recognise that both our national unity and our basic liberties 
were fragile. Was the shock worth whatever the P.O.R. might have accomplished? 
The P.O.R. were truly repressive, the stuff of a police state. Can their imposition be 
justified?
The argument in support of the actions of the Government of Canada is most 
clearly set out in Gérard Pelletier’s 1971 book The October Crisis.n Pelletier was a 
Minister in the Trudeau government. He was also a long-time friend of the Prime 
Minister, a Québécois, and an intelligent and thoughtful person. His justification for 
what happened is roughly as follows. Political violence in Québec had been increas­
ing over many years. The kidnappings of Cross and Laporte were simply the cli­
mactic acts in a process which had come to directly threaten the social order. 
Furthermore, the situation had deteriorated to the point where the police in Québec 
could no longer keep it under control. Only decisive and timely action by Ottawa 
could restore order. Since the Government of Canada had been democratically elect­
ed, it could legitimately intervene in Québec in the way it did to uphold the public 
interest.
There are some serious flaws in Pelletier’s argument. Some of these flaws are 
empirical; some involve issues of principle.
At an empirical, or practical, level Pelletier’s argument contains its own justi­
fication: it worked. We crushed political terrorism in Québec. The argument is also 
self-serving and misleading. Bombing, kidnapping and murder were all crimes in 
Canada and could have been dealt with under existing Canadian law. More to the 
point, the P.O.R. did not prevent Pierre Laporte’s murder and the Armed Forces did 
not, as we have seen, catch his murderers. The proclamation of the War Measures Act 
and the promulgation of the P.O.R. did not result in the permanent incarceration of 
large numbers of dangerous political terrorists
The F.L.Q. might have been crushed, but at what price? Certainly what hap­
pened in October 1970 did not mean the end of Québécois nationalism nor of the 
desire of many Québécois for independence. In fact, these were strengthened. The
50 Smith, supra note 3738 at xi.
51 Pelletier, supra note 3738. One of the great ironies of Canadian history is that Pelletier, Trudeau and 
Pierre Vallières were all involved in th rpioduclion of Ciré Libre in rh^garty T960s.
acts of the Government of Canada and the spectacle of armed English-speaking sol­
diers52 enforcing repressive laws, operated as a validation of the perspective argued 
by the F.L.Q. and by Pierre Vallières. The truth of their analysis of the relationship 
between Québec and Canada was being demonstrated daily in the streets of 
Montréal. The legacy of the P.O.R. was bitterness and resentment, a strengthening of 
the climate which has seen a rejection of Canada on the part of many Québécois.
The damage to the principles of constitutional government was grave. Pierre 
Trudeau treated the constitution of Canada as if it were his personal possession.53 
Other states have experienced far more serious threats to order than two kidnappings 
and one murder and yet managed to keep their constitutions and basic liberties intact. 
Many Canadians today feel alienated from their institutions and I believe that 
October 1970 was an important milestone in the process of alienation. Canadians saw 
how easy it was for the government to set aside rights they had long imagined to be 
fundamental. They also saw that institutions which they thought belonged to them 
actually belonged to Ottawa.
The F.L.Q. was a group of bumbling amateurs who could not possibly have 
been a real danger to any social order.54 In other words, Ottawa imposed a repressive 
law to deal with what I believe was a non-existent crisis. Certainly, kidnapping and 
murder were serious things in October 1970. But kidnapping and murder are just as 
serious today. We do not declare a national state of emergency every time either 
occurs.
g. The War Measures Act and Democracy
Speaking in the House of Commons in May 1940, M. J. Coldwell, M.P., the leader 
of the C.C.F., dealt eloquently with the effect of the War Measures Act on democra­
cy. He said:
We are prepared to support the struggle against aggression and for the preserva­
tion of democratic institutions, but we insist that democratic institutions be 
respected and safeguarded in our own country... Ever since the outbreak of war 
we have been governed by decree, largely in secrecy.55
52 This is not entirely correct. Of the 7500 troops who were deployed in Montréal, many were fran­
cophones from the Royal 22ième Regiment (the “Van Doos”). See J. L. Granatstein, Canada's Army: 
Waging War and Keeping the Peace (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) at 365-366.
53 The most powerful critique of the events of October 1970 remains Smith, supra note 37.
54 This is brought out very clearly in Haggart and Golden, supra note 38. The F.L.Q. was, by no means, 
the equivalent of the Provisional I.R.A.
55 Canada, Parliament, House o f Commons Debates, 9 (20 May 1940) at 51.
3. The Emergencies Act
In 1988 Parliament repealed the War Measures Act and replaced it with a fresh statute 
called the Emergencies Act.56 The new statute was a considerable improvement on its 
predecessor. A major problem with the War Measures Act was its all-or-nothing 
nature. Once the Act was proclaimed, the entire country was subject to an all-out, full 
scale emergency. As we have seen, the earlier Act was drafted in such a way as to 
limit the possibility of legislative or judicial control over its use. Finally, an emer­
gency under the War Measures Act would last until the Govemor-in-Council decid­
ed that it should end.
The Emergencies Act addressed, and overcame, many of these deficiencies in 
the War Measures Act. The new Act created four different levels of emergency, each 
of which is defined as a “national emergency.” These are:
1. Public Welfare Emergency;57
2. Public Order Emergency;58
3. International Emergency;59 and
4. War Emergency.60
A Public Welfare Emergency would, I suspect, be the result of either a natural 
disaster or a human-made disaster, while a Public Order Emergency might be 
declared in response to something like a general strike. It is far from clear precisely 
what constitutes an International Emergency. The most severe form of emergency, a 
War Emergency could be declared in response to “... war or other armed conflict, 
real or imminent.”6i Both a Public Welfare Emergency and a Public Order 
Emergency may be declared in a specific region of Canada.
In each case, the emergency is to be declared by the Govemor-in-Council. 
Before doing so the Governor must believe on “reasonable grounds” that an emer­
gency exists.62 This wording leaves open the possibility of judicial review of the 
invocation of emergency powers. In each case, the declaration must be laid before
56 S.C. 1988, c. 29.
57 Ibid. part I.
58 Ibid. part II.
59 Ibid. part III.
60 Ibid. part IV.
61 Ibid., s. 37.
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Parliament, which is given broad authority to revoke it.63 In each case, the state of 
emergency is to lapse automatically after a specified period of time.64 Again, in each 
case, the Govemor-in-Council may make regulations to deal with the emergency.65 
In the first three categories of emergency, this authority is limited and would likely 
not extend to the imposition of internment or censorship.
However, the powers given to the Govemor-in-Council during a War 
Emergency are nearly as broad as those that were created under the War Measures 
Act. The Govemor-in-Council is authorized to make “... such orders or regulations 
as the Govemor-in-Council believes, on reasonable grounds, are necessary or advis­
able for dealing with the emergency.”66 The langauge of this provision suggests that 
the Governor’s rule-making power is not intended to be as limitless as that found in 
s. 3 of the War Measures Act.
What about a War Emergency and the Canadian Charter o f Rights and 
Freedoms'? Given the broad language of s. 40 of the Emergencies Act, it seems 
inevitable that there would be derogations from Charter rights during a War 
Emergency. Given this likelihood, Parliament might have been expected to invoke 
s. 33 of the Charter when it enacted the Emergencies Act, and thus declare that the 
Act operates notwithstanding the Charter. Given that this was not done, it would be 
for the courts to determine, on a case by case basis, whether particular derogations 
from Charter rights pursuant to a War Emergency could be justified in a free and 
democratic society.
The only reference to emergencies in the text of the Charter is oblique and 
indirect. Section 4(1) of the Charter states that the maximum life of a House of 
Commons or a provincial legislative assembly is to be five years. Section 4(2) adds 
that,
“in time of real or apprehended war, invasion or insurrection,67 the life of a
House of Commons or a legislative assembly may be extended beyond five
years.”
63 ibid., s. 7(1).
64 With a War Emergency, the period is 120 days. (Ibid., s. 39(2)).
«  Ibid., s. 8(1).
66 Ibid., s. 40(1).
61 These words were evidently borrowed from the War Measures Act.
4. The Anti-terrorism Act
September 11, 2001 was a dark day in human history. Many people, especially media 
commentators, appear to believe that history began on that date. The same people 
also apparently believe that “horrific” is a real word. In response to those events, 
Parliament enacted the Anti-terrorism Act (the “ATA”).6* The Act contains a pream­
ble which states, in part, “ ... while continuing to respect and promote the values 
reflected in and the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Canadian Charter o f 
Rights and Freedoms.”69 This preamble is, for me, reminiscent of the preamble to 
the P.O.R., in that the substance of the ATA appears to contradict the preamble.
The ATA is a questionable statute. It appears to be an attempt on the part of the 
state to cloak itself with emergency powers through the back door, without actually 
declaring an emergency under the Emergencies Act. The ATA recognizes guilt by 
association.70 It also proscribes what would once have been regarded as normal polit­
ical activity.71 The Act substantially broadens the power of peace officers to arrest 
persons without a warrant.72 It also allows peace officers to detain persons where the 
peace officer “suspects” such detention to be necessary to prevent “terrorist activi­
ty”.73 Persons may also be detained where their detention is “necessary for the safe­
ty of the public.”74 The ATA allows a judge to make an order for the “... investiga­
tion of a terrorist offence.” This order may also authorize the “gathering of informa­
tion.”^  Persons may be required to answer questions even if the questions are 
incriminating.76 Property may be seized pursuant to the Act on the ex parte applica­
tion of the Attorney General.77 The Act is also badly drafted. It is unreasonably long 
and contains barbarisms such as the use of “they” as a third-person singular pro­
noun.78
68 S.C. 2001, c. 41. For a discussion of the ways other Commonwealth states have responded to 11 
September, see (2002) 9 Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative News, no. 1 at 8-18.
69 S.C. 2001, c. 41, Preamble.
to Ibid., s. 83.01(l)(b)(i).
7> Ibid., s. 83.01 (l)(b)(i).
72 Ibid., s. 83.3(4).
73 Ibid.
™ Ibid., s. 83.3(7)
75 Ibid., s. 83.28(4).
™ Ibid., ss. 83.28(8) and (10).
77 Ibid., s. 83.13(1).
78 Ibid., s. 16(3). For academic analysis of the A.T.A., see, Ronald J. Daniels, Patrick Macklem and 
Kent Roach, eds., The Security o f Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill (Toronto: 
Usivefsky of Toronto Press, 2()01 ). ---------------
The ATA was designed ostensibly to deal with a crisis.79 It abrogates, as we 
have seen, a number of the rights which Canadians enjoy in normal times. For these 
reasons, the ATA can be characterized as emergency legislation. Unfortunately, the 
ATA seems to create a permanent state of emergency. The ATA does contain a “sun­
set clause”, according to which the Act is to lapse shortly after December 31, 2006.80 
However, despite its “sunset” clause, the ATA will stay in operation far longer than 
would have been the case with a War Emergency declared pursuant to the 
Emergencies Act.
Some sense of how the courts might deal with the ATA can be gleaned from the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Suresh v. Minister o f Citizenship and 
Immigration.81 Suresh was a citizen of Sri Lanka who had been granted refugee sta­
tus in 1991. He was a member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (L.T.T.E.) 
and had raised funds for a group associated with the L.T.T.E. The Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration issued a certificate under s. 40.1 of the Immigration 
Act,82 alleging that there “...were reasonable grounds to believe that Suresh had 
engaged in terrorism or was a member of an organisation that had engaged or would 
engage in terrorism” and was, as a result, inadmissible to Canada.83 On this basis the 
Minister ordered that Suresh be returned to Sri Lanka. Suresh applied to the Federal 
Court for judicial review of this deportation order. This application was dismissed. 
The Federal Court of Appeal upheld this decision. The Supreme Court of Canada 
allowed an appeal from the decision of the Federal Court of Canada and remitted the 
matter to the Minister. The Court accepted Suresh’s argument that:
.. .he [had] not been involved in actual terrorist activity in Canada, but merely in 
fundraising and support activities that may, in some part, contribute to the civil 
war effort of Tamils in Sri Lanka.84
79 Ibid., Preamble,
so ibid., s. 83.32.
8' (2002), 208 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.).
82 R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2.
83 (2002) 208 D.L.R. (4th) at 3.
84 Ibid., at 8. Martin Loney has noted that,
“Many” Tamils who had sought “refugee” status remained active partisans, raising an 
estimated $7 million a year in funds to support the conflict in Sri Lanka. Fund-raising 
was assisted by extortion. Loney quoted the Globe and Mail about a “disturbing esca­
lation of crime” in the Tamil community in Toronto and the apparent increase in intim­
idation to silence critics of the L.T.T.E.
Martin Loney, The Pursuit o f Division: Race, Gender and Preferential Hiring in 
Canada (Montreal and Kingston,: Mcgill-Queen’s University Press, 1998) at 224. For 
further discussion of the L.T.T.E. in Canada, see Robert Fife “Canada is Helping 
Tamils, Expert” National Post (10 September 2003).
Thus, it appears that the Supreme Court of Canada does not equate raising money for 
terrorists with engaging in terrorism. As I read the judgments in the Supreme Court, 
it seems the judges were more concerned with ensuring that human rights norms 
from international law were applied, than with protecting Canadians of Tamil ori­
gin.85
Conclusion
The current Canadian position with respect to emergency powers is unsatisfactory. 
Canada’s constitution should expressly address the use of emergency powers. Were 
we to amend our constitution so that it included express provisions governing both 
the invocation and the use of emergency powers, we would be doing ourselves a real 
service. The struggle against terrorism may well be a protracted one. While I believe 
that Canadians should take part in this struggle, I also believe 
that we must be vigilant to ensure that we do not sacrifice our system of 
constitutional government to it.
85 It often seems that, in what passes for public policy discourse in Canada, human rights is the domi­
nant, if not the only, consideration. It has been argued that the real problem with the ATA is that it 
might subvert our human rights culture. Stephen J. Toope, “Fallout from ‘9-11’: Will a Security 
Culture undermine Human Rights?” (2002) 65 Sask. L. Rev. 281. In a similar vein, see Joanna 
Harrington, “Punting Terrorists, Assassins and Other Undesirables: Canada and the Human Rights 
Committee and Requests for Interim Measures of Protection”, (2003) 48 McGill Law Journal 55. Kent 
Roach, September 11: Consequences for Canada (Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2003) is a highly ideological discussion of these matters. Roach’s book argues against doing 
anything ^ bout the attacks on the United States. -- —
